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Abstract 
Structural separation between network and retail functions is 
increasingly being mandated in the telecommunications sector to countervail 
the market power of incumbent operators. Experience of separation in the 
electricity sector offers insights for telecommunications. Despite apparent 
competitive benefits, the costs of contracting increase markedly when short-
term focused electricity retail operations are separated from longer-term 
generation infrastructure investments (which require large up-front fixed and 
sunk cost components). The combination of mismatches in investment 
horizons, entry barriers, and risk preference and information asymmetries 
between generators and retailers leads to thin contract markets, increased 
hold-up risk, perverse wholesale risk management incentives, and 
bankruptcies. Direct parallels in the telecommunications sector (e.g. separated 
retail and infrastructure functions) indicate exposure to similar complications, 
intensifying many of the contractual risks arising from regulated access 
arrangements. In both sectors, competition between vertically integrated 
providers appears more likely to efficiently and sustainably induce both 
investment and competition than separation. 
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1. Introduction 
Structural separation between wholesale and retail functions is 
increasingly being mandated in telecommunications sectors around the 
world. Electricity sectors—which share many features in common with 
telecommunications—have long experience with structural separation, which 
has commonly arisen as a key element of sector liberalisation. Notably, while 
integrated electricity operators may have been an artificial “norm” pre-
liberalisation, vertical integration is now rapidly re-emerging—where it has 
been permitted—in response to failings in wholesale-retail contracts (a 
necessary concomitant of structural separation). These failings have 
manifested themselves in poor wholesale price and quantity risk 
management, problems of adverse selection and strategic bargaining in the 
presence of asymmetric information and market power, forestalled 
investment (undermining supply insecurity), and company failures. Research 
into structural arrangements in the electricity sector increasingly suggests that 
vertical integration between wholesale and retail functions is the more natural 
and resilient industry structure. Indeed, vertical integration supports 
investment, mitigates market power, and sustains competitive retail entry. 
Research also highlights the (potentially destructive) role of excessive retail-
level competition in undermining contracting, investment, and durable retail 
competition.  
What lessons can be learned for telecommunications sectors from the 
experience of contracting and re-integration in electricity sectors? Do 
telecommunications sectors share the important characteristics that 
complicate contracting (and hence structural separation) in electricity sectors? 
If they do, is vertical integration the natural response for telecommunications, 
as it appears to be for electricity? Or are the other interventions sometimes 
suggested for electricity, such as regulating for contracts, to be preferred? The 
debate between structural separation and vertical integration in each sector 
highlights important questions about the optimal degree and durability of 
retail competition, optimal arrangements for managing risks and mitigating 
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market power and asymmetric information, the importance of the trade-off 
between static and dynamic efficiency, and the relative efficacy of 
endogenous and regulated approaches to industry restructuring. 
In this paper we argue that structural separation in 
telecommunications suffers from a number of the key problems that 
complicate contracting in electricity, as well as its own industry-specific 
problems. Furthermore, we argue that vertical (re-) integration in 
telecommunications is a preferable solution to problems of wholesale market 
power, asymmetric information, and of sustaining retail competition, as it is 
in electricity. It also better supports investment, and hence dynamic 
efficiency. We also argue that integration—for both electricity and 
telecommunications—is a preferable contracting solution to interventions 
such as regulating for contracts . Short-term efficiency gains may be realised 
from separation, but at the expense of long-term investment and with the risk 
of unsustainable retail competition. Hence, while the aims of separation are 
sound, integration may in fact better serve their achievement. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses economic 
theories of ownership and the boundary of the firm. Section 3 summarises the 
aims and experience of structural separation and contracting in a sample of 
restructured electricity sectors, highlighting the features of electricity systems 
that have complicated contracting. It then discusses the re-emergence of 
vertical integration in response to these complications, emphasising the 
features of integration that make it preferable to contracting. Section 4 applies 
these lessons in the context of selected telecommunications sectors. Common 
features shared with electricity—as well as those distinguishing 
telecommunications from electricity—are surveyed. Arguments both for and 
against vertical integration, as an alternative to contracting, are presented. 
Section 5 discusses the resulting policy implications. 
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2. Separation versus Integration—the Theory 
Following Coase (1937) and Williamson (1985), transaction cost 
economics offers insights into why economic activities are organised 
internally (within firms) or externally (mediated by transactions in markets).1 
Under this approach, economic activities are presumed to be undertaken 
through market transactions (either spot trading, or longer-term contracting) 
unless the costs of such transactions favour internal organisation within firms. 
The costs of market transacting include: 
• transaction costs (especially with repeated transactions),  
• contractual incompleteness and bounded rationality (e.g. when 
it is hard to predict uncertain demand growth),  
• costs of contractual hold-up (parties renegotiating or reneging 
on commitments, and stranding long-term and/or relationship-
specific investments of their counterparties),  
• costs of market power imbalances between transacting parties 
(especially in the presence of asymmetric information), and  
• costs of regulation (such as compliance costs, costs of distorted 
investment incentives, regulatory hold-up risks, and possibly 
inefficient pricing).  
The transaction costs economics literature also sheds light on why 
some firm patrons—such as capital providers, suppliers, and customers—are 
more natural owners of a given firm (Hansmann, 1996). Ownership of a firm 
naturally falls to those patrons enjoying the lowest combined costs of 
                                                     
1  For a fuller presentation of our analytical framework, the problems of contracting in electricity sectors, and reasons 
why vertical integration is emerging as a solution to these problems, see Meade and O’Connor (2009). Related discussions can be 
found in Finon and Perez (2008), and Chao, Oren & Wilson (2005). 
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ownership and market contracting. Thus, firms integrate—either vertically 
(upstream or downstream) or horizontally (across activities in different 
supply chains)—when the costs of market contracting exceed those of 
ownership. Ownership costs include agency costs, the costs of collective 
decision making, and the costs of risk bearing (i.e. diversification and capital 
access in imperfect capital markets).  
Of course, how firms integrate or de-integrate (vertically separate) in 
practice involves additional considerations of political economy. 
3. Lessons from Electricity Sector Reforms 
Historically, electricity sectors in many developed economies were 
based around either state-owned (e.g. United Kingdom, New Zealand) or 
privately-owned, regulated (e.g. United States) monopolies, integrating 
generation, transmission, distribution, and energy retailing. Increasing 
dissatisfaction with the performance of such integrated firms, combined with 
a wider shift towards market-based organisation (e.g. through privatisation) 
and fiscal imperatives, resulted in a re-evaluation of the traditional model. 
The development of a new model was aided by technology changes that 
reduced the minimum efficient scale of generation, as well as by a new 
economic understanding of how the electricity sector could be re-organised 
along competitive lines. Such re-organisation would involve some parts of 
electricity sectors (i.e. generation and retailing) being organised along 
competitive lines so as to induce efficient pricing and investment decisions, 
while “natural monopoly” (and “enduring bottleneck”) elements such as 
transmission and distribution would continue to require regulation or other 
measures to constrain market power or induce efficiencies. The upshot of 
these developments was a period of electricity sector restructuring in many 
countries (see Wolak, 1999, and Politt, 2007, for reviews). 
Often, sector restructuring took the form of both horizontal and 
vertical separation. The former required transmission and distribution 
activities to be ring-fenced from the potentially competitive activities, to avoid 
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these “natural monopoly” elements being used to foreclose competitive entry 
in generation and retailing. More controversially, and of note for this paper, 
was the forced separation of generation and retailing activities (i.e. vertical 
separation, mirroring that increasingly undertaken in telecommunications 
reforms). This separation was predicated on a belief that a combination of real 
and financial contract markets (including real-time spot and forward 
wholesale electricity markets, as well as futures and other derivative markets) 
would develop to support competitive entry by energy retailers and 
generators alike. Such contracts would supposedly enable industry 
participants to manage wholesale price risks, possibly countervail against 
residual market power (especially in oligopolistic generation), and provide 
investors with the revenue security required to support long-term, sunk 
generation investments. The benefits of vertical integration—in this case 
between generation and retailing—were not given much consideration, 
beyond mere reference to economies of scope, information sharing, and 
internal coordination. 
Experience with contracting 
The experience of contracting in reformed electricity sectors has fallen 
well short of expectations (see Meade & O’Connor, 2009, Anderson, Hu & 
Winchester, 2006, Chao, Oren & Wilson, 2005, and Hansen, 2004). Even in 
sectors with relatively liquid contract markets (e.g. Australia—see Simhauser, 
2008, Anderson et al., 2006, Chester, 2006—and the United Kingdom—see 
Pollit 2007, Thomas, 2004, Roques, Newbery & Nuttal, 2005), contract 
durations are commonly of not more than about three years, well short of the 
term required to underwrite long-term generation investments. Additionally, 
hold-up problems from “hit and run” retail entry have emerged, given 
divergences in the contracting preferences of generators and retailers.  
Generators face relatively high entry costs and prefer long-term 
contracts to support investments. In contrast, retailers face relatively low 
entry costs and prefer short-term contracts, because contracting at fixed prices 
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for a long term creates a risk of being undercut by new entrants (or bypassed 
by large customers) if wholesale prices fall during the life of the contract. The 
temptation for a retailer who holds a high-priced long-term contract in such 
circumstances is to renege, or possibly face bankruptcy. Anticipating such 
hold-up risks, generators offer to supply fewer contracts. They also invest at 
less than the efficient level, all other things being equal. Cascading hold-up 
risks then lead to the inducement of inefficient investment upstream of 
generation—for example, in fuel exploration (e.g. gas) or supply (e.g. 
coalfields or uranium mines). 
Other mismatches between the contracting preferences of generators 
and retailers—and also between generators and large energy users with 
whom they contract in wholesale markets—may also arise. For example, 
industrial customers may have load profiles (e.g. seasonal or daily demand 
variations) that do not align with generators’ production profiles (e.g. base-
loaded coal-fired generators with ramp-up/down costs). Similarly, 
mismatches in fuel and demand uncertainty can cause a misalignment of 
contracting preferences. Retailers or industrial customers may desire assured 
supply security, whereas generators with uncertain fuel supplies (e.g. hydro 
generators exposed to uncertain hydrology) may prefer force majeure supply 
clauses to avoid penalties in the event of non-supply. Where large customers 
contract directly with oligopolistic generators and have inferior information 
regarding generators’ fuel supplies and availability, they face adverse 
selection costs when entering into long-term contracts (i.e. they might contract 
at disadvantageous terms, placing them at a competitive disadvantage in their 
own output markets). Finite contract durations expose all parties to 
renegotiation risks.  
These problems combine to thin contract markets, making prices more 
prone to market power abuse and adverse selection (amongst other 
complications), and undermining the role of contracts in inducing investment, 
managing risks, mitigating market power, and inducing competitive retail 
entry. Critically, deficiencies in contracting have resulted in inadequate 
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wholesale price risk management, reduced investment, and even 
bankruptcies. For example, in California (and also in the United Kingdom) 
many investors relied on high wholesale prices to finance investments in the 
absence of long-term contracts to provide security, which proved to be to 
their detriment when wholesale prices fell and gas prices rose (Joskow, 2006).  
Some authors suggest that the natural response to such problems in 
contracting is to regulate for contracts (e.g. Willems and De Corte, 2008), or to 
re-instate retail franchise areas—i.e. retail monopolies (e.g. Chao et al., 2005, 
Roques, 2008, Newbery, 2002, 2002a). Under these “solutions” greater contract 
market liquidity would be induced (albeit artificially), or the problem of “hit 
and run” retail entry would be resolved with the blunt instrument of imposed 
monopolies. Such solutions are likely to involve welfare loss, and should only 
be preferred if they involve less loss than other possible alternatives. 
Vertical integration as a “natural” solution 
However, vertical integration may circumvent the need for harsh 
(regulatory) interventions. Such integration (between generation and 
retailing) is now re-emerging in various electricity systems—in particular, in 
the United Kingdom, Australia, European Union, and New Zealand ( 
Simhauser, 2008, European Commission, 2007, and HMDSG, 2005)—not as a 
consequence of policy, but rather endogenously, in systems where it is 
allowed.2 In New Zealand, for example, it emerged as an unintended 
consequence of simultaneous reforms which horizontally separated the then 
dominant generator (Electricity Corporation of New Zealand) into three 
smaller firms, and which independently separated the ownership of retailing 
and distribution activities.3 Previous constraints on integration between 
generation and retailing were lifted at the same time that retailers were made 
available for sale, with the consequence that the newly-formed generators and 
their competitors quickly set about acquiring retail bases. This process was 
                                                     
2  As a consequence, regulators and politicians/reformers in such jurisdictions often view such a change with suspicion. 
3  See Evans and Meade (2005) for a discussion. 
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largely completed when the main non-integrated retailer suffered substantial 
losses when faced with sticky retail prices but soaring wholesale prices in a 
time of tight hydro reserves in a hydro-dominated system. It was forced to 
divest itself of its retail customers to generators—the only parties with a 
natural hedge against surging wholesale prices—in order to stem its losses. 
Vertical integration of generation and retailing appears to be a more 
self-sustaining alternative to contracting—induced or otherwise. Critically, 
integration internalises wholesale price risks and the risks of market power 
abuse to the firm. As shown by Hogan and Meade (2007), so long as 
integrated firms have balance between their generation and retail load, they 
do not face incentives to exert market power over wholesale prices. This is 
because any extra profits they secure at the wholesale level translate into 
reduced retail-level profits, given that the wholesale price is an input cost to 
their own retail arm. Conversely, non-integrated generators with market 
power, or integrated generators with unbalanced generation and load, do face 
incentives to manipulate wholesale prices.  
Since integrated generators have a natural hedge against changes in 
wholesale prices through self-generation, they can reduce wholesale price risk 
markedly, facing wholesale volatility only in respect of their relatively small 
need to transact on wholesale markets to remedy short-term imbalances in 
their own supply and load. Furthermore, by internalising wholesale electricity 
price risks to the firm, integrated generators are not as exposed as non-
integrated generators to investment-distorting regulations such as wholesale 
price caps.4 They tend also to be larger and more diversified than non-
integrated generators and retailers, further enhancing their advantages in 
managing price and quantity risks, securing finance, and undertaking large-
scale investments. Finally, integrated generators face favourable ownership 
                                                     
4  While price caps in systems reliant on wholesale markets and contracting are often regarded as a necessary constraint 
on generator market power, despite their obvious suppression of investment signals, their rationale is reduced in integrated 
systems where the incentives to exercise such market power are lower. 
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costs relative to smaller, non-integrated competitors, and much reduced 
market transacting costs. 
Together, such considerations mean integrated generators are more 
“bankable” ventures, with greater financial substance, more secure profit 
margins over longer time-frames, and natural means to hedge their financing 
and investment risks. This in turn supports their ability to expand generation 
and then competitively enter into retail markets.  
Integration can be argued to increase entry barriers in retailing, in that 
it reduces the volume of contracts offered by generators to third parties (i.e. 
thins contract markets), and means that retailers also need to invest in 
generation capacity if they are to compete with integrated generators. 
However, this presupposes that retail entry should begin at the retail level. 
The counter to this argument is that, by thinning contract markets, integrated 
generators are less exposed to “hit and run” retail entry (since less contracts 
are available to such entrants) and the resulting hold-up. Reducing such 
exposure enhances the generators’ ability to underwrite long-term and large, 
sunk generation investments. This in turn enables them to expand 
downstream into retail on a more sustainable basis. 
The re-emergence of vertical integration in electricity sectors—where it 
has been allowed, and albeit only in respect of generation and retailing—
raises important questions about the optimal degree of competition in both 
retail and wholesale markets. Cut-throat competition in retailing has been 
regarded as a useful device to reduce retail energy costs. However, the 
experience in electricity sectors is that such competition results in 
complications at the wholesale level, where long-term investments and 
oligopolistic generation are the norm. These problems have served to 
undermine investment and supply security, thin contract markets, potentially 
worsen problems of wholesale market power, and undermine the viability of 
stand-alone retail entry. 
Vertical integration, by contrast, does not rely on retail competition to 
redress any persistent problems of wholesale market power. Instead, it side-
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steps these problems by reducing the incentives for generators to exercise 
market power. More importantly, integration contributes to dynamic 
efficiency by supporting more efficient levels of investment, and thereby more 
sustainable retail entry (by generators expanding downstream) and hence 
retail competition. In turn it supports more efficient levels of investment in 
upstream activities, such as fuel exploration or supply, where similar 
problems of long-term investment arise.  
Thus, too much competition in retailing can be detrimental to welfare, 
and oligopoly in generation need not be sub-optimal (given the relevant 
production technologies) provided generation is balanced with load. Where 
vertical integration naturally emerges in response to deficiencies in 
contracting in structurally separated (i.e. de-integrated) sectors, this should 
give cause to carefully consider policy initiatives that impose artificial 
structural separation. The belief that contract markets will efficiently provide 
the necessary means to mitigate market power, support investments, sustain 
retail competition and manage price and quantity risks—and do so more 
efficiently than in integrated markets with a much reduced role for 
contracting—does not appear to have been borne out in electricity reforms. 
4. Applying the Lessons from Electricity Reforms to Telecommunications 
As noted in the introduction, the telecommunications and electricity 
sectors share many similar features. Some such features are structural—for 
example, both sectors have “natural monopoly” elements (local access 
networks in telecommunications are akin to electricity transmission and 
distribution lines). Much of the current literature on telecommunications 
focuses on potential problems with—and proposed remedies for—these 
structural features. For example, some commentators note that an integrated 
incumbent with natural monopoly power may foreclose competitive retail 
entry, giving rise to arguments in support of separation as a means of 
increasing competition (e.g. Cave, 2002, 2006; Xavier & Ypsilanti, 2004; de Bijl, 
2005). As noted in section 3, similar arguments have been presented for the 
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electricity sector. These arguments propose that vertical separation makes 
competitive retail entry feasible for new firms, as it removes the necessity of 
duplicating the bottleneck asset. Such entry may ultimately (via a “ladder of 
investment”) allow new retailers to consolidate market shares (Cave, 2006a), 
and may extend to upstream competitive entry in facilities (such as backhaul 
and unbundled local loops in the telecommunications sector, or retailers 
investing in generation in electricity). Theoretically, any activities that 
occurred under vertical integration could be replicated by contractual 
agreements between the (separated) access provider/lines company and 
either downstream customers or upstream firms (Cave, 2006). Such 
arrangements increase efficiency so long as the additional costs of both 
ownership and contracting imposed under separation are exceeded by the 
gains from increased competition (assuming that, in the absence of any 
mandatory requirement for separation, firms in the sector tend towards 
vertically integrated because this is the most economically efficient form of 
organisation given the combined costs of both ownership and market 
contracting).  
However, it may be more illuminating to focus on a different set of 
features that the telecommunications and electricity sectors share—namely, 
those surrounding asset ownership, contracting, and risk management (see 
Table 1). These features present additional costs of unbundling that the pro-
separation arguments outlined above fail to take into account.  
As Table 1 identifies, significant contractual risks arise in both 
electricity and telecommunications from a mismatch in investment horizons. 
Upstream firms (network operators) have long-lived assets, comprising 
substantial proportions of fixed and sunk costs, which expose them to risks 
associated with investment in and ownership of such assets. In contrast, 
retailers have a shorter-term focus, and can (and indeed via regulation and/or 
structural reforms are incentivised to) enter the industry with minimal asset 
holdings and hence minimal investment risk exposure. Under these 
conditions, a key contractual challenge emerges when new investment is 
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required to increase network capacity (increase generation capacity) and both 
network (generation) and retail operations face competition. 
Of course, as Table 1 also indicates, the two sectors do not face 
identical contracting challenges. Although the mismatch of investment 
horizons is a problem for both, in electricity the requirement for additional 
capital investment in more technologically stable distribution networks 
(where risk of bypass is negligible as these are truly enduring bottleneck 
assets) is much lower than currently in the more volatile telecommunications 
market. A closer parallel in investment horizon mismatches occurs in the 
electricity generation–retail dimension, where continually increasing demand 
for electricity necessitates ongoing investment in increased generation 
capacity, akin to the current increases in telecommunications consumer 
demand for more and faster bandwidth. The contractual challenges related to 
new investment in a competitive environment are particularly salient in the 
telecommunications sector, where traditional fixed-line network operators 
face competition from mobile, wireless, and cable network operators and 
(under convergence of end user applications) consumers can access the same 
end applications over multiple network platforms. 
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Table 1: Features that Complicate Separation and Contracting, and Favour 
Integration in the Electricity and Telecommunications Sectors 
 Electricity Sectors Telecommunications Sectors 
Hold-up 
Risks 
 Long-lived, large, and sunk 
investments in generation 
 Low entry costs allowing hit and run 
retail entry, undermining wholesale-
retail contracting 
 Finite contract durations Æ 
renegotiation risks  
 Load profile and risk preference 
mismatches between generators and 
customers 
 Retailers can be bypassed by large 
customers 
 Cascading hold-up risks to 
generators’ upstream suppliers with 
own long-lived, large and sunk 
investments (e.g. coal, gas, uranium) 
 Long-lived, large, and sunk investments 
in networks  
 Low entry costs allowing hit-and-run 
entry, plus additional risk of horizontal 
competition by non-telcos (e.g. by 
mobile or power companies) 
 Finite contract durations result in 
renegotiation risks, with regulatory 
complications 
 Retailers can be bypassed if permitted 
under wholesale regulation 
 Rapidly changing technologies lead to 
network investment hold-up risks  
Wholesale 
Risks 
 Fuel and demand uncertainty 
 Wholesale price uncertainty 
 Forward market illiquidity due to 
non-storability of electricity and 
asynchronous transmission markets 
 Retail demand uncertainty 
 Short term contracts exacerbated by 
regulatory uncertainty arising from 
with repeated adjustments to access 
prices as technology prices fall  
Regulatory 
Uncertainty 
 Contracting exposed to competition 
authority intervention 
 Wholesale price caps introduce risk 
of regulatory time-inconsistency 
 Short term dictated by regulatory 
provisions 
 Contracting exposed to regulatory time-
inconsistency 
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 Electricity Sectors Telecommunications Sectors 
Asymmetric 
Information 
and Strategic 
Bargaining 
 Generators have informational 
advantages regarding fuel and plant 
availability/outages, and market 
power asymmetry relative to 
retailers 
 Retailers struggle to forecast long-
term supply-demand balance 
 Retailers have informational advantages 
regarding demand growth and 
customer technology preferences 
characteristics 
 Network operators struggle to forecast 
long-term supply-demand balance, 
exacerbated by regulations encouraging 
over-much retail entry 
 Retailers have market power 
asymmetry relative to wholesalers and 
network operators Æ Risk of adverse 
selection as integrated, less efficient 
competitors can enter and gain market 
share from a separated more efficient 
incumbent facing higher costs of 
ownership and contracting 
Market-
Power 
 Contestable retail level and large 
customer output markets  
 Concentration at wholesale level due 
to scale economies in production, 
investment and diversification 
 Contestable retail level under access 
regulation 
 Concentrated wholesale market due to 
small number of platforms 
Ownership 
Costs 
 Favour large, diversified and 
integrated generator-retailers 
 Favour large, diversified and integrated 
network operator-retailers 
Contracting 
Costs 
 High, due to limited contract 
durations and hence and regular 
renegotiation, differences in load-
profile and risk (e.g. force majeure) 
preferences, as well as asymmetric 
information and strategic bargaining 
risks (increasing search and 
negotiation costs). 
 High, due to regulatory overheads, 
asymmetric information, forecast errors, 
artificial governance arrangements 
Initial 
Conditions 
 Excess capacity leads to depressed 
wholesale prices and low 
contracting, but often large legacy 
contracts in place at time of 
liberalisation 
 High retail demand uncertainty leads to 
natural tendency towards consumer 
ownership as a means of overcoming 
contractual uncertainty; artificial 
separation prevents this from occurring 
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Hold-Up, Wholesale and Regulatory Uncertainty Risks in 
Telecommunications 
As in electricity markets, a mismatch of investment horizons leads to 
increased risk of investment hold-up when telecommunications retailers and 
network operations are separated. In order to justify investment in new 
network capacity, telecommunications network owners require either 
established demand from their own retail arm or long-term contracts with 
separated retailers. Separated telecommunications retailers face few 
incentives to enter into long-term contracts with network operators, as they 
too can be undercut by subsequent new entrants negotiating a better access 
deal. Howell (2007) notes an example of such behaviour from the New 
Zealand telecommunications market:  entrants awaited potentially more 
favourable terms from a regulatory agreement rather than entering pre-
emptively into commercial bitstream access agreements with the incumbent. 
As a result, end consumers were denied the dynamic competitive benefits of 
earlier bitstream access during the nine months of regulatory negotiations.  
Telecommunications markets have not developed the financial markets 
and contracting instruments anticipated to emerge for wholesale electricity, in 
part due to the differences in time-dependency—telecommunications 
capacity, whilst constrained, does not require instantaneous consumption or 
balancing of supply and demand as in electricity. Thus, there is no direct 
parallel in telecommunications to the wholesale price risk factors of separated 
electricity markets.  
However, historic patterns of regulatory intervention in access and 
retail markets have exacerbated hold-up risk problems and resulted in similar 
behaviour and contractual artefacts. Regulated access agreements encourage 
‘hit and run’ entry by retailers with low entry costs in the first place 
(Hausman, 2002; Crandall, 2005), regardless of whether the network operator 
is integrated with or separated from its retail arm. Whilst regulatory 
agreements reduce the costs of a network operator contacting with multiple 
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separated retail firms (e.g. using standard terms contracts), unless those 
contracts adequately compensate the network operator for the options 
granted to retailers to enter and exit (Guthrie, 2006), then similar contractual 
weaknesses associated with separation of network operation and retail 
services in electricity markets will prevail also in telecommunications 
markets.  
 In order to induce retail entry, telecommunications regulatory access 
contracts typically enable entrants to buy network services on a very short-
term basis, replicating the renegotiation risks observed in the electricity 
market and reducing incentives to invest. Renegotiation risk is further 
exacerbated by retail regulatory obligations facilitating end-consumer 
switching, which prevent longer-term customer agreements with retailers that 
would be necessary for retailers themselves to enter into longer-term 
contracts with network operators. Constantly decreasing regulated prices 
based upon hypothetically efficient current (decreasing) network costs further 
bias entrants towards preferring short-term rather than long-term contracts. 
When demand for new network services is already highly uncertain, or there 
is a very real risk that entrants will use the existing (separated) network to 
build up market share that is subsequently shifted to their own networks 
bypassing the incumbent, the incentives for the incumbent to invest in new 
capacity are even further reduced (Bourreau & Dogan, 2005).  
The imminent risk of technological bypass in telecommunications 
markets as fibre-optic cable (or even mobile or wireless) becomes the 
broadband technology of choice poses additional contractual and strategic 
behaviour risks for separated telecommunications operators with copper-
based technologies. On the one hand, with new technologies imminent, 
retailers will prefer increasingly shorter-term contracts with the copper 
network operator, as they await either that firm’s investment or competitive 
entry by another investor. On the other hand, both the incumbent and entrant 
require either long-term contracts or vertical integration with a retail 
operation to ascertain demand and therefore justify investment in the first 
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place. If both entrant and incumbent must be vertically separate, increasingly 
shorter retail contract preferences will inevitably exacerbate delays in 
investment occurring, regardless of the identity of the investor.5  
However, if the entrant can be vertically integrated, but the incumbent 
cannot, then all else being equal, the entrant faces lower costs than the 
incumbent to build the new network, placing the incumbent at a competitive 
disadvantage with respect to investing in the new technology. At worst, the 
entrant may actually have a higher cost of investing in the new technology 
than the incumbent (e.g. a higher cost of capital), but by carefully selecting the 
areas where investment occurs (e.g. geographical or commercial market 
segments) to mirror existing retail patterns (e.g. where the entrant is a retail 
customer of the incumbent), the additional advantages of integration may 
enable entrant deployment of the new technology at a retail price lower than 
that of the incumbent.  
Under such circumstances the more efficient provider would lose 
market share to the less efficient provider, leading to adverse selection and 
lower welfare. To restore efficient entry incentives, mandatory separation 
applying only to the incumbent must therefore also be accompanied by 
additional regulation imposing a tax (as per Armstrong, 2001) on vertically 
integrated entrants, leading to separation increasing (rather than reducing) 
regulatory overheads. Given the complexity and extent of transaction costs 
involved in compensating even for simple universal service distortions 
(Howell, 2007), it may be simpler and more efficient to forego vertical 
                                                     
5  With respect to the current debate about providing incentives for new fibre networks to be deployed, it is worth noting 
that historically, following Hansmann (1996), both new electricity and telecommunications utilities were initially built because 
end consumers effectively internalised the risks associated with retail demand uncertainty by assuming ownership of the fixed 
and sunk assets. Many utilities were constructed as consumer-owned co-operatives with consumers providing the initial capital 
(Howell and Sangekar, 2009; Evans and Meade, 2005). Where governments funded initial development from taxation revenues, 
this was in effect the ultimate form of a consumer-owned co-operative with mandatory consumer-taxpayer ownership rather than 
optional consumer-only participation. When governments allocated regulated monopoly franchises to private firms, once again 
the residual risks were borne ultimately by consumers, via retail prices that might be higher than costs (with the regulatory 
contract negotiated by government as the collective representative of end-consumer taxpayer/risk-bearers). This suggests that 
ultimately, new investment in such assets requires some means of involving the consumer directly in the risks of asset ownership, 
via either a retail contract or a direct ownership stake. Vertical separation artificially breaks this natural nexus, so is best reserved 
for mature networks with minimal extension or development requirements. 
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separation altogether and instead focus upon providing better incentives to 
induce competition between more competitively equivalent vertically 
integrated networks in these circumstances.  
Additional regulatory risk accrues in separated telecommunications 
markets when the network operator is required to offer services on equal 
terms to all customers, regardless of the identity of the end consumers. Large 
end consumers (e.g. businesses) may wish to contract directly with the 
network operator for services, bypassing a retail operator, in the same manner 
as large commercial electricity consumers may prefer to contract directly with 
generators. However, this imposes a further level of regulatory 
intervention/separation in telecommunications markets between network 
and wholesale services, increasing both the costs of co-ordination and 
attendant regulatory risk as these contracts too become subject to the same 
hold-up and gaming risks exhibited in retailer-network contracts.  
Vertically integrated firms can internalise hold-up, wholesale risks, and 
regulatory risks with respect to their own retail operations—the larger the 
retail market share, the lower the risks and the more likely it is that some (but 
not fully efficient) investment will occur.6 However, mandatory separation of 
retail and network operations precludes any such internalising from 
occurring. Separation thus increases the investment hold-up risk over access 
regulation alone, suggesting that, when imposed, separation must also be 
accompanied by compensatory changes in the terms of regulatory access 
contracts (e.g. higher returns on capital allowed, locking in entrants to longer-
term purchase obligations, imposing bonds on entrants) in order to ensure 
equivalent investment incentives are offered vis-à-vis the vertically integrated 
counterfactual.  
                                                     
6  Although vertically integrated firms arguably face increased risk of regulatory intervention by virtue of their large 
size and monopoly position (making them a target for regulators), these risks are offset by their limited contracting volumes (and 
hence limited regulatory exposure). 
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Information Asymmetry Risks in Telecommunications 
Again in a parallel with electricity generators, telecommunications 
network operators face information asymmetries that are exacerbated by 
separation from retail operations. End consumer demand for new 
telecommunications technologies (e.g. fibre-optic cable broadband), 
applications, and bandwidth is highly uncertain, and likely more so than in 
the more technologically stable electricity market. A network operator needs 
access to retail demand information to determine not just which technology to 
build, but where to place it and when to deploy it. Electricity generators are 
less reliant on consumer information as energy source uncertainty (e.g. gas 
supplies) is independent of consumer preferences. Because of complementary 
investments and consequent switching costs, telecommunications consumers 
care about upstream network technology type (e.g. DSL or fibre-optic cable). 
Hence, the timing of deployment of new technologies at the retail level takes 
on a co-ordination importance for telecommunications network operators and 
retailers. This does not occur in electricity, as retail customers can cheaply 
switch between retailers without changing appliances or configurations. 
Together, these characteristics suggest important co-ordination costs arising 
from information asymmetries are greater in telecommunications than in 
electricity markets, and may be efficiently dealt with by retail-network 
integration.  
Regardless of technology types, both generators and network operators 
face uncertainties as retail demand increases. Retailers have active 
engagement with end consumers that is denied to separated network 
operators (or generators). A separated network operator must rely solely 
upon the forward orders placed by retailers to guide network investment 
patterns, without any ability to cross-check the accuracy of the estimates, as 
can be done by an integrated operator against its own retail projections. The 
rapid technological development in upstream telecommunications 
applications means that the problem of downstream demand uncertainty is 
exacerbated in telecommunications relative to the more stable pattern of retail 
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demand increases in electricity. In both industries, separation encouraging 
increased competitive retail entry increases information asymmetry risks and 
hence costs relative to the vertically integrated case. Notably, ownership 
separation lowers the incentives for retailers to take due care in making 
demand forecasts—the lower the costs of retail entry, the less the retailer has 
at risk, so the less important it is that the retail forecast is accurate, relative to 
an integrated operator. Moreover, separation inducing low-cost retail entry 
magnifies individual retailer forecast error effects due to the risk of 
substantially more entry than is efficient (characteristic of differentiated 
product monopolistically competitive markets—Carlton & Perloff, 2005).  
Even if all entrants are responding individually to the same aggregate market 
demand projection, the ensuing demand estimates (to which the network 
operator must generally respond at the level of each contract in order to meet 
regulatory agreements) will be systematically biased upward as the entrants 
fail to adequately estimate the effect of other competitive entry decisions on 
their likely market share. Smaller the entry costs, lead to larger numbers of 
entrants, greater aggregate forecast errors and thus higher risk of inefficient 
over-investment (and asset stranding). A network operator anticipating such 
occurrences faces even greater incentives to withhold or delay initial 
investment in new technologies, exacerbating the potential hold-up problem. 
Such costs can be efficiently mitigated by contractually sharing some of the 
risks borne by network owners with retailers (e.g. binding entrants to long-
term contracts with penalties for reneging). 
Extending the logic of ownership risk sharing via contracts, however, 
ultimately returns the separation debate back on itself. Separation is often 
proposed as a means of inducing entry by removing the costs of ownership 
from potential entrants; but it fails to send correct investment signals unless 
access contracts transfer sufficient ownership risks to entrants. If new 
investment were unnecessary, and future demand reasonably stable, then it 
would be easier to price ownership risk into access contracts. However, when 
new investment is needed and demand is increasingly uncertain, it becomes 
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harder to contractually apportion these risks, and the more likely it becomes 
that the most efficient arrangement lies in ownership (i.e. vertical integration) 
rather than contracting.  
A key lesson for telecommunications is thus that inherent 
uncertainties, especially at the current point in time of technological 
uncertainty, suggest very real contractual risks associated with separation of 
network and retail operations. These risks exacerbate many of the problems 
already induced by access regulation, and will likely impede deployment of 
new technologies. With new bypass technologies available, the ‘natural’ 
tendency in telecommunications industry structure appear to be towards 
competition between vertically integrated network-retail operators, just as has 
emerged in those electricity markets where vertically integrated generator-
retailers have been allowed to become the norm.  
5. Policy Implications and Conclusions 
Reforms in both electricity and telecommunications sectors have been 
based on the laudable aim of encouraging competition where it has 
historically been absent, at least in those parts of the sectors amenable to 
competition. As a means to an end such competition should induce more 
efficient pricing and investment decisions, at least in a static neoclassical 
sense. The vertical separation of potentially competitive and non-competitive 
parts of each sector has often been at the centre of such reforms, relying on 
contracting and other market transacting between industry components 
where ownership was no longer permitted. Through such separation greater 
competition—at least in retail parts of the sector where entry costs are 
relatively low—is facilitated, and indeed, allowing vertical integration 
between even the competitive parts of the sector could raise entry barriers 
that are apparently at odds with reform aims. 
The experience of electricity reforms, however, highlights problems in 
this approach. Not only has the approach failed to perform as expected, but it 
potentially requires the pursuit of an inferior aim. Indeed, encouraging 
atomistic competition in retailing when there are scale economies and long-
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lived, sunk investments in upstream generation has served to undermine both 
parts of the sector. Hit and run retail entry undermines contracting between 
retailers and generators, which serves to reduce both retail entry and 
investment in generation. Vertical integration, by contrast, overcomes the 
difficulties of contracting and thereby supports both investment, and retail 
entry. Importantly, it supports downstream entry by generators, rather than 
the non-integrated retail entry often assumed necessary for successful 
reforms. In so doing it overcomes the criticism that integration raises entry 
barriers by forcing retail entrants to have upstream generation—in effect the 
criticism is misplaced, being predicated on a faulty expectation of how 
competition durably arises in sectors with oligopolistic upstream competition.  
There are key similarities between electricity and telecommunications 
sectors, as well as telecommunications-specific features which reinforce the 
problems of contracting in electricity sectors. This suggests that the aim of 
policy in both sectors should be to support durable competition at both 
wholesale and retail levels, with realistic expectations as to the extent of likely 
competition given technological constraints. Indeed, the aim of policy should 
be to maximise the prospects of such constraints being relaxed, which 
necessarily requires incentives to be maintained for investments in competing 
technologies in those parts of the sectors subject to oligopolistic competition. 
Technical uncertainty in a non-integrated system can be a source of the 
problems of contracting; in an integrated system, with competing integrated 
providers, it can instead be the source of evolving competition.  
At the heart of these trade-offs—between encouraging retail 
competition at the expense of upstream investment (and hence both upstream 
and retail competition)—are important issues of risk-management. Reforms 
have often emerged against the experience of investment risks being unduly 
borne by consumers or taxpayers. The danger now is that reforms have 
shifted the balance of risk-sharing too far towards investors, which only 
exacerbates any inherent problems of contracting in separated systems. In 
turn this excessive imposition of risk on investors undermines investment 
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(and hence the long-term evolution of competition), and creates short-term 
problems of supply security/adequacy. 
Hence, any policies which encourage or result in intense retail 
competition—at the expense of internalising the problems of investment, risk 
management and market power mitigation between retailing and upstream 
activities—may be self-defeating. They risk confusing the means (i.e. 
competition) with the end (efficient sector evolution). They potentially also 
undermine efficient risk sharing between investors and consumers, for short 
term benefits at the expense of longer-term gains. The fact that non-integrated 
systems based on contracting tend to be imposed, whereas integrated systems 
often emerge endogenously where permitted, further highlights the inherent 
attractiveness of integrated over separated structures for both electricity and 
telecommunications. 
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